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NOTE
ACTION BETWEEN SPOUSES TO RECOVER FOR
PERSONAL TORTS
At common law the husband and wife became one person by mar-
riage. According to Blackstone "the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated in
and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protection
and cover she performs everything."' As a result the wife could not
sue anyone without the husband's consent and joinder. Any recovery
of personal property by her would immediately vest title in him. An
action between the spouses was impossible. If the husband were named
as defendant he could not join as plaintiff to permit her action.2 Since
he was liable for the torts of the wife committed both before and after
marriage and since he was entitled to her choses in action, a suit by
her against him would place the husband in the manifestly impossible
position of being liable to himself for damages.3 This bar to an action
between spouses applied to antenuptial torts of the husband as well.4
Even after divorce the wife was not permitted to maintain an action
against the husband for a personal tort committed during coverture.
This harsh common law doctrine was mitigated by a creation of equity
known as the wife's separate estate. By means of this device equity
regarded married women in relation to their separate property as if
they were sole. 6 To apply this theory it was a prerequisite that the
estate be expressly created by some instrument or conveyance. This
could be done by agreements made before or after marriage, by gift,
deed or devise. The case of Jacques v. Methodist Episcopal Church7 in-
volved an antenuptial agreement by which the wife conveyed her prop-
erty to a trustee subject to her power to control its disposition after
marriage. The New York court in deciding this case followed the view
taken in England and many of the states that the wife could dispose of
her separate estate without the consent of the trustee unless she was
expressly restrained from so doing by the instrument creating it. There-
fore an agreement affecting it would be enforced unless there was
fraud or an unfair advantage taken of her. A more limited view of the
wife's power to alienate her separate estate has been taken by many of
the states. For example, in Holliday v. Hively,8 a Pennsylvania case, it
was held that a separate estate did not include the power of complete
2 1 BL. Comm. * 442.
2 MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMEsTIc RELATIONS, 220.
3 HARPER, TORTS, sec. 288.
4Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462, 32 L.R.A. 848 (1896).
5 Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906).
6 Littleton v. Sain, 126 Tenn. 461, 150 S.W. 423, 41 L.R.A. (x.s.) 1118 (1912).
17 Johns (N.Y.) 549, 8 Am. Dec. 447 (1820).
8198 Pa. 335, 47 Atl. 988 (1901).
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disposition as an incident thereto but rather was limited to that given
by the terms of the instrument. Since the wife had not been given the
power to convey the fee in lands left her in trust under a will, she was
not permitted to exercise that right. The same state refused to recog-
nize the attempt to create such an estate unless the woman was married
or in immediate contemplation of matrimony.0
Equity permitted actions between spouses concerning their property
relations only. In Stone v. Wood 0 the husband was allowed to have a
deed to his wife set aside on a showing that it was obtained by fraud.
It was stated that equity would afford relief between the spouses in
cases of this kind as readily as it would between other persons. The
jurisdiction in equity over suits between husband and wife was ex-
tended to actions to secure her separate property, to relieve from coer-
cion, to enforce trusts and to establish other conflicting rights, but
would not apply to a suit on a simple contract for the payment of
money in the absence of circumstances raising some equitable consid-
eration.' In Frankel v. Franke 2 the wife was allowed to maintain an
equitable action to recover money belonging to her separate estate and
obtained from her by the husband through fraud and coercion. Wood-
ard v. Woodard"3 involved a situation where husband and wife sold
certain property held by them as joint tenants. It was agreed that he
would divide the proceeds with her and upon his refusal to do so
equity enforced the agreement and permitted the wife to recover the
property, or, if converted, to compel restitution from the husband's sep-
arate estate. Similarly, where a wife had released her dower right by
joining in a mortgage to secure a debt of the husband she could enforce
her rights against him by subrogation, if she paid the debt.' 4 The aid
of equity also has been invoked by the husband to recover insurance
policies wrongfully withheld by the wife,'5 and by the wife to enforce
her title to property previously conveyed to her by the husband.' 6
These cases serve to illustrate the remedy afforded by equity in cases
where the spouses asserted conflicting rights in property.
Under the present statutes, in force in every state, and known as
the Married Women's Acts, wives are recognized as distinct legal en-
tities with distinct legal rights in property. It was a natural step from
the protection previously afforded by equity to permit one spouse to
enforce his or her rights in a suitable action at law as if sole. Most
states permit either the husband or wife to sue the other for injury to
9 Appeal of Neale, 104 Pa. St. 214 (1883).
20 85 I1. 603 (1877)
11 Gahm v. Gahm, 243 Mass. 374, 137 N.E. 876 (1922).
2133 Mass. 214, 53 N.E. 398 (1899).
1 3216 Mass. 1, 102 N.E. 921 (1913).
14 Fitcher v. Griffiths, 216 Mass. 174, 103 N.E. 471 (1913).
15 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 227 Mass. 288, 116 N.E. 494 (1917).
16 English v. English, 229 Mass. 11, 118 N.E. 178 (1918).
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property.'7 The statutes have been construed to permit a spouse to
maintain such actions as trover, detinue, replevin and ejectment. How-
ever a few states still adhere to the common law doctrine and refuse to
permit any action between spouses other than those which may be
brought in equity.' Representative of this minority view is the case of
Metzler v. Metzler,19 in which an action was brought in New Jersey by
the wife to enforce a New York judgment based on a contractual rela-
tionship with the husband and obtained under the laws of that state
which permitted her to bring an action based on the contract. The New
Jersey court refused to enforce the judgment on the ground that equity
alone could give relief on a contract of this kind when the action was
brought by one spouse against the other. In another action by the wife
against the administrator of her husband to enforce an agreement made
by him to leave her the proceeds of his life insurance policy if she did
not contest his will it was held in Smith v. Coggan" that the wife
could not recover on the contract since it was invalid under the law of
the state and that a proper showing had not been made for relief in
equity.
At common law no action was permitted between the spouses for
personal torts. This rule applied to negligent as well as intentional
torts. The prohibition was based on the theory that to permit actions
between spouses would tend to disrupt domestic peace and tranquility.
An illustrative case is that of Abbot v. Abbot2' in which the plaintiff,
a divorced wife, instituted an action for assault and battery committed
upon her during coverture. It was held that the action could not be
maintained against the husband or those who aided him. Although the
present statutes are substantially uniform in providing that a married
woman shall have the right to sue and be sued as if sole, there has
been a great diversity of opinion among the states as to whether or not
they shall be interpreted to impose personal tort liability between the
spouses. Three distinct rules have been developed. 1) The majority
view adheres to the strict common law rule forbidding such actions.
2) A minority group has permitted a spouse to maintain an action for
intentional tort. 3) A still smaller group has adopted constructions of
the Married Women's Acts which permit husband and wife to sue one
another for personal tort of any character.
The conservative position follows the federal rule of Thompson v.
Thompson.2 This was an action for assault and battery brought in the
-7 Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 147 La. 315, 84 So. 794 (1920); Lombard v. Morse,
155 Mass. 136, 29 N.E. 205, 4 L.R.A. 273 (1891).
28 MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 222.
'9 8 N.J. Misc. 821, 151 A. (2d) 847 (1930).
20263 Mass. 248, 160 N.E. 799 (1928).
2167 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877).
22218 U.S. 611, 31 S.Ct. 111, 54 L.Ed. 1180 (1910).
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District of Columbia by the wife against the husband. It was held that
the action could not be maintained. The court felt that a construction
permitting suit would give the statutes such a radical and far reaching
change from the policy of the common law as to be outside the legisla-
tive intent. It was said that such a change should only be made by
statutory language so plain and clear as to be unmistakable. In Ewald
v. Lane,2 a recent case arising in the same jurisdiction, a married
woman was allowed to bring an action against those who had con-
spired with the husband to have a false charge of adultery made against
her in a divorce action. The husband's demurrer was upheld but that of
his co-defendants was overruled on the theory that the statute did allow
a married woman to bring an action against those who had joined with
her husband in committing a tort against her. It was reasoned that the
law had removed the procedural bar to actions against the others who
had wronged her, even though she could not sue the husband. Among
the states which have refused to depart from the common law rule are
Georgia, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas. 24 In a Texas case 5
the wife was not permitted to bring an action for a tort allegedly com-
mitted during coverture in spite of the fact that the husband had pro-
cured an annulment of the marriage.
In view of the strong dissent in the Thompson case,2 6 which was a
four to three decision, many states were encouraged to modify or
depart from its rule. A typical case allowing recovery for an intentional
injury was that of Fiedeer v. Fiedeer27 where an action was brought
by a divorced wife for damages resulting from personal injuries from
a gunshot wound inflicted on her by her husband prior to the divorce.
The court stated that the public policy of the state would best be served
by allowing actions as a result of such brutal assaults. Brown v.
Brown 28 is expressive of the attitude of the states which have permitted
actions for assault and battery. Holding that it was not against public
23 104 F. (2d) 222 (App. D.C. 1939).
24 In re Dolmadge's Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927) ; Blickenstaff v.
Blickenstaff, 89 Ind. App. 529, 167 N.E. 146 (1929); Broaddus v. Wilkinson, 281
Ky. 601, 136 S.W. (2d) 1052 (1940); Palmer v. Edward, 179 La. 937, 155 So.
483 (1934) ; Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 188 Atl. 724 (1937) ; David v.
David, 161 Md. 532, 157 Atl. 755 (1932); Lubowitz v. Taines, 198 N.E. 320
(1935) ; Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939) ; Patenaude v.
Patenaude, 195 Minn. 522, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); McLaurin v. McLaurin
Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180, 146 So. 877 (1933) ; Willot v. Willot, 333
Mo. 896, 62 S.W. (2d) 1084, 99 A.L.R. 114 (1933); Conley v. Conley, 92
Mont. 425, 15 P. (2d) 922 (1932) ; Klinger v. Steffens, 17 N.J. Misc. 118, 6 A.
(2d) 217 (1939).25 Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W. (2d) 445 (Texas, 1938).
26 Note 22 supra.
2742 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022, 52 L.R.A. (N.s.) 189 (1914).
28 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914).
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policy, the court reasoned that there would be little danger of such an
action while a shred of mutual respect and affection remained between
the spouses. Consequently, the court said, there would be an equal
danger of public inconvenience and scandal if the spouses were left to
answer assault with assault and slander with slander until finally the
public peace was broken and the criminal law invoked. On similar
grounds actions for intentional torts have been permitted in New
Hampshire, North Carolina and South Carolina.29 It is interesting to
observe that these states now open the door to actions for negligent
injury as well.30 Colorado has joined the ranks of those states per-
mitting recovery for negligent injury. Rains v. Rainsy' was an action by
the wife for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident
caused by the negligence of her husband, the defendant. This court
felt that its statutes clearly gave the wife the right to maintain an
action. The same decision has been reached in similar cases in Alabama
and Arkansas.3 2 Kentucky does not allow the wife to sue the husband
in tort but this was held no bar to a recovery by the wife in the case
of Broaddus v. Wilkenson,33 where her action was brought against the
husband's employer who was the owner of the automobile in which she
was riding at the time of her injury. Recovery was permitted although
the injury was a result of the negligence of the plaintiff's husband.
Here it was said that the wrong was that of the master as well and
recovery could be had against him even -though plaintiff's action against
the servant was barred. Both New York and Minnesota have permitted
the wife to recover damages for injuries sustained in automobile colli-
sions when the action was brought against the owners who had given
the husbands permission to drive.34
Since its admission to the union in 1848 Wisconsin has been very
liberal in extending the legal rights and removing the legal disabilities of
married women. The argument to the effect that a statutory provision
permitting a wife to proceed against her husband for personal injuries
would result in a flood of litigation seems to have been disproved in this
state. It was not until 1926 that the Supreme Court was called upon
to determine whether or not an amendment of 1881 permitted such an
29 Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 Atl. 657, L.R.A. 1916 L (1915) ; Crowell v.
Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) ; Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45,
102 S.E. 787 (1920).
30 Miltimore v. Milford Motor Co., 197 At. 330 (1938) ; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103
Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432, 44 A.L.R. 785 (1926) ; Earle v. Earle, 198 N.C. 411, 151
S.E. 884 (1930) ; Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932).
3197 Colo. 19, 46 P. (2d) 740 (1935).
32Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669, 101 S.W. '(2d) 961 (1937); Bennett v.
Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932).
33281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W. (2d) 1052 (1940).
34Miller v. J. A. Tyrholm & Co., 196 Minn. 438, 265 N.W. 324 (1936) ; Riemers
v. Clark, 300 N.Y. Supp. 31 (1937).
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action. The question was presented by the case of Wait v. Pierce,35 an
action against copartners in the garage business for injuries sustained
as a result of the negligent operation of an automobile by one of their
employees. Plaintiff's husband was made a party defendant on the
ground that he was jointly liable. The husband's demurrer on the theory
that the wife could not maintain an action against him for injuries due
to his negligence was overruled. The court felt that an exception should
not be read into the statute to bar actions against the husband. They
believed that it did not create a new power for married women but
merely restored an old one which had been lost by marriage, hence the
intent of the legislature need not be expressed in clear and unmistak-
able terms. Such a construction was deemed not against public policy,
although the court recognized the fact that many other jurisdictions do
not reach the same conclusion in construing similar statutes.36 Within
a short time this position was affirmed by permitting a wife to bring
an action against her husband for personal injuries sustained while rid-
ing in his car and alleged to be a result of his negligenceY In Hensel v.
Hensel Yellow Cab Co.38 the wife sued for personal injuries sustained
while riding in a truck of the defendant, a family corporation, of
which her husband, the driver, was president. The accident occurred in
Ohio, which does not permit a wife to sue her husband for a tort.
Since Ohio had never decided whether a married woman could bring
an action of this kind against her husband's employer, recovery was
allowed. The inability to sue the husband did not extend to a suit
against the employer for the husband's wrongful act. Suit was also
permitted in Wisconsin when the accident occurred there although both
husband and wife were residents of Illinois, which would bar the
action.39
If there were any doubt as to the Wisconsin position regarding the
rights of the spouses it has been clarified by the interpretations of the
statute enacted in 1921 purporting to give equal rights to women.40 In
affirming the doctrine of Wait v. Pierce,41 the court called attention to
the fact that it had been based in part on the above section, and that
there had been three legislative sessions since that decision with no
change by amendment. This was taken as indicative of legislative satis-
faction with the construction.4 2
ROBERT D. JONES.
35 191 Wis. 202, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
36 Note, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 55.
R Moore v. Moore, 191 Wis. 232, 209 N.W. 483 (1926) ; Grant v. Asmuth, 195
Wis. 458, 218 N.W. 834 (1928).
38 209 Wis. 489, 245 N.W. 159 (1932).
39 Forbes v. Forbes, 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112 (1938).
4oWIs. STAT. (1939) § 6.015.
41 Note 35, supra.
2 Fontaine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410 (1931).
